![]() ![]() To date, however, discussions of good governance have focused almost exclusively on agrarian states.Īrchaeological evidence suggests that early humans began fishing and shellfishing at least 150,000 years ago ( Marean et al., 2007 Colonese et al., 2011 Cortés-Sánchez et al., 2011). (2021): public goods, bureaucratization, and controls exercised over governing principals. By extension, we might expect maritime societies to display variation with regard to the dimensions of good governance identified by Blanton et al. off-shore), as well as social factors, including the size and homogeneity of the population, the effectiveness of political leadership, and cultural values toward sharing ( Wilson et al., 2013 Acheson, 2015, p. These studies suggest that the character of common property regimes established among maritime groups varies with physical factors, such as the relative abundance and mobility of the resource and the physiography of the habitat (e.g., inshore vs. 16–19) define four classes of property-rights related to fishers based on increasing collective-choice rights: from users, to claimants, proprietors, and owners.Ĭonsistent with the understanding of variability in rights to fisheries, ethnographers have documented great diversity in the common property regimes associated with contemporary maritime societies, from open access to territorial and exclusive (e.g., McCay, 1980, 1998, 2001 Cordell and McKean, 1986 Begossi, 1995 Aswani, 1999, 2002 Acheson, 2003, 2015 Aswani and Hamilton, 2004). These rights also vary individually with regard to social position Schlager and Ostrom (1993, p. 47) and, as Schlager and Ostrom (1992, 1993) observe, the property-rights regimes of fishers vary with regard to rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation (i.e., transfer of ownership). Still, property is best conceived as a “bundle of rights” ( North, 1990, p. 1) has noted that oceans “are almost always held as common property” owing to the fact that marine resources are typically low in value relative to the costs to defend them. Collective action in the Calusa area resulted in projects of greater scale and complexity, providing a foundation for more hierarchical and authoritarian social formations.Īcheson (2015, p. ![]() In contrast, collective action developed later in the Calusa area, may have begun in relation to resource scarcity than plenty, and may been founded in kinship rather than in public ritual. Historically, these changes resulted in societies of relatively small scale and limited authoritarian government. Groups here staked claims to productive estuarine locations through the founding of villages, the building of mounds, and the construction of relatively simple marine enclosures. Archaeological evidence suggests that collective action became more important in Tampa Bay in the first centuries CE, probably owing to a marine transgression that resulted in more productive estuaries. ![]() We summarize research into the development and form of collective action among the maritime societies of the western peninsular coast of Florida, USA, drawing on our own recent work in the Tampa Bay area and previous work elsewhere in the region, especially the Calusa area to the south. However, the collective action regimes developed among ancient maritime societies remain understudied by archaeologists.
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